My note on McShane's “Implementation” article indicates what I have learned from it (a) about its author, (b) about Lonergan, and (c) about implementation of Lonergan’s transcendental method. My sheaf of quotations from the article may offer a focus – not distorting, I hope – different from the reader’s own.

In an increasingly diverse America, the experience of race and racial discrimination is too often described as if it is the same for all racial and ethnic groups. Utilizing the perspective on ethnic and racial groups developed by Zolberg that stresses their contingent and dynamic nature, we explore ethnic and racial discrimination in depth. Drawing on data from the New York Second Generation Study we describe the experience of prejudice and discrimination among eight groups of young adults-native born whites, native (...) born blacks, native born Puerto Ricans, and second generation Dominicans, South Americans, Chinese, West Indians and Russian Jews. While the experience of racial discrimination is common to many Americans, the nature and severity of that experience varies widely among the increasingly diverse people that are now often lumped together as "minorities" in the popular imagination. African Americans, and those who most often confused with African Americans have different kinds of experiences than other non white groups. They face more systematic and brighter racial boundaries than do Asians and light-skinned Latinos. This creates more formidable obstacles for those defined as black, as opposed to those who are just "nonwhite" to full incorporation into American society. We propose a typology of types of discrimination that begins to unpack this complex phenomena. (shrink)

The Great Philosophers, From Thales of Miletus (ca. 620-540 b.c.), "The first natural scientist and analytical philosopher in Western intellectual history," to W.V.O. Quine (1908-2000): "Only science can tell us the truth about the world" Philosophy is a thorough and accessible introduction to the Western intellectual tradition, covering philosophical, scientific, and religious thought over a period of 2,500 years. Offering brief summaries of the work of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, as well as Copernicus, Machiavelli, Galileo, Spinoza, Voltaire, Adam Smith, Mary (...) Wollstonecraft, Thomas Paine, Darwin, Marx, Freud, Simone de Beauvoir, Levi-Strauss, and Einstein, to name just a few, this book will serve as an invaluable guide for those seeking a clear introduction to the work of individual philosophers. A lucid and engaging book, Philosophy is sure to stimulate and absorb students and laymen alike. (shrink)

In a now famous thought experiment, Frank jackson asked us t0 imagine an omniscient scientist, Mary, who is coniincd in a black-and-white room and then released into the world 0f color . Assuming that she is omniscicnt in respect of all physical facts—roughiy, all the facts available to physics and all the facts that they in turn Hx or determine-physicalism would suggest that there is no new fact Mary can discover after emancipation; physicalism holds that all facts are physical in (...) the relevant sense . Yet we cannot help but feel that coming out of that room would be an occasion of dramatic enlightenment and, in particular, an occasion for learning facts to do with how red or yellow or blue 100ks or, as it is usually said, with what it is like t0 sec red or yellow or blue. Many in the black-and—whit<—: room knew all the physical facts about the world, where these may be taken to include three sorts of color facts: objcctual facts, as to what surface colors different objects have, assuming as I shall do throughout—that colors are properties of objects; intentional facts, as to which colors different objects 0r apparent objects are represented as having in the subjc-:ct’s experience, rightly or wrongly; and nonintentional facts, about what such color experiences are like in their effects on subiccts—wh<—:ther they are comforting, or arousing, or whatever. But, according to the argument, Mary didn’t know how any color looks or, equivalently, what color experience is like in itself, not just in its effects O1'1 subjects. This particular nonintentional fact about the quality of color c-zxpc-2ri<—:ncc-—this phenomenal fact, as it is often describcd—she did not. (shrink)

L’anthropologie philosophique est l’un des fronts sur lesquels s’est développée, ces dernières années, la critique du libéralisme politique : à la figure d’un sujet rationnel et souverain, déjà autonome, certains courants de la théorie politique ont tenté d’opposer une conception alternative du sujet et c’est dans ce contexte qu’a émergé la thématique de la vulnérabilité dont le développement est apparu comme le fondement éventuel d’un dépassement de la problématique libérale. On ne s’étonnera pas de voir la référence à la vulnérabilité (...) figurer en bonne place dans la réflexion néorépublicaine et en particulier dans la théorie de liberté comme non-domination élaborée par Philip Pettit. Comment les néorépublicains définissent-ils la vulnérabilité et quel statut lui accordent-ils ? Quel rôle la vulnérabilité joue-t-elle dans la définition d’une perspective républicaine originale et dans l’élaboration d’une conception non libérale de l’autonomie ? Que nous apprend-elle enfin sur les limites éventuelles du projet néorépublicain ? C’est à ces questions que tentent de répondre les deux articles rassemblés ici. Ces deux textes correspondent aux deux volets d’une étude sur le statut de la catégorie de la vulnérabilité dans la théorie néorépublicaine. Le premier article (« Vulnérabilité, non-domination et autonomie : l’apport du républicanisme ») correspond au volet proprement analytique de notre étude : il propose un état des lieux du statut de la vulnérabilité dans le cadre des théories néorépublicaines, de Pettit à Iseult Honohan, en passant par John Maynor... L’examen de l’articulation entre vulnérabilité et non-domination met en lumière les ressources du néorépublicanisme et son potentiel d’élargissement (via l’intégration des problématiques socialistes, multiculturalistes, écologistes et féministes). Le second article (« Vulnérabilité, non-domination et autonomie : vers une critique du néorépublicanisme ») part de la manière dont les néorépublicains ont souligné la convergence entre l’autonomie telle qu’elle est pensée à l’aune de la non-domination et les approches relationnelles de l’autonomie. Il s’agit pour nous d’interroger ce rapprochement et par là de dégager certaines limites de l’approche néorépublicaine de la vulnérabilité en la confrontant de façon systématique à d’autres conceptions mises en avant dans la théorie des « capabilités », dans les théories de la reconnaissance et dans les éthiques du care. (shrink)

Comparisons between related species often allow the detailed genetic analysis of evolutionary processes. Here we advocate the use of the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans (and several other rhabditid species) as model systems for microevolutionary studies. Compared to Drosophila species, which have been a mainstay of such studies, C. elegans has a self‐fertilizing mode of reproduction, a shorter life cycle and a convenient cell‐level analysis of phenotypic variation. Data concerning its population genetics and ecology are still scarce, however. We review molecular, behavioral (...) and developmental intraspecific polymorphisms for populations of C. elegans, Oscheius sp. 1 and Pristionchus pacificus. Focusing on vulval development, which has been well characterized in several species, we discuss relationships between patterns of variations: (1) for a given genotype (developmental variants), (2) after mutagenesis (mutability), (3) in different populations of the same species (polymorphisms) and (4) between closely related species. These studies have revealed that evolutionary variations between sister species affect those characters that show phenotypic developmental variants, that are mutable and that are polymorphic within species. BioEssays 23:807–819, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

L’anthropologie philosophique est l’un des fronts sur lesquels s’est développée, ces dernières années, la critique du libéralisme politique : à la figure d’un sujet rationnel et souverain, déjà autonome, certains courants de la théorie politique ont tenté d’opposer une conception alternative du sujet et c’est dans ce contexte qu’a émergé la thématique de la vulnérabilité dont le développement est apparu comme le fondement éventuel d’un dépassement de la problématique libérale. On ne s’étonnera pas de voir la référence à la vulnérabilité (...) figurer en bonne place dans la réflexion néorépublicaine et en particulier dans la théorie de liberté comme non-domination élaborée par Philip Pettit. Comment les néorépublicains définissent-ils la vulnérabilité et quel statut lui accordent-ils ? Quel rôle la vulnérabilité joue-t-elle dans la définition d’une perspective républicaine originale et dans l’élaboration d’une conception non libérale de l’autonomie ? Que nous apprend-elle enfin sur les limites éventuelles du projet néorépublicain ? C’est à ces questions que tentent de répondre les deux articles rassemblés ici. Ces deux textes correspondent aux deux volets d’une étude sur le statut de la catégorie de la vulnérabilité dans la théorie néorépublicaine. Le premier article (« Vulnérabilité, non-domination et autonomie : l’apport du républicanisme ») correspond au volet proprement analytique de notre étude : il propose un état des lieux du statut de la vulnérabilité dans le cadre des théories néorépublicaines, de Pettit à Iseult Honohan, en passant par John Maynor... L’examen de l’articulation entre vulnérabilité et non-domination met en lumière les ressources du néorépublicanisme et son potentiel d’élargissement (via l’intégration des problématiques socialistes, multiculturalistes, écologistes et féministes). Le second article (« Vulnérabilité, non-domination et autonomie : vers une critique du néorépublicanisme ») part de la manière dont les néorépublicains ont souligné la convergence entre l’autonomie telle qu’elle est pensée à l’aune de la non-domination et les approches relationnelles de l’autonomie. Il s’agit pour nous d’interroger ce rapprochement et par là de dégager certaines limites de l’approche néorépublicaine de la vulnérabilité en la confrontant de façon systématique à d’autres conceptions mises en avant dans la théorie des capabilités, dans les théories de la reconnaissance et dans les éthiques du care. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd Reviews 181 MARRIAGE AND MORALSy REVISITED Philip Ebersole Greater Rochester Russell Set Rochester, ny 14607, usa [email protected] Timothy J. Madigan Philosophy / St. John Fisher College Rochester, ny 14618, usa [email protected] Katie Roiphe. Uncommon Arrangements: Seven Portraits of Married Life in London Literary Circles, 1910–1939. New York: The Dial Press, 2007. Pp. 343. isbn 978-0-385-33937-7 (...) (hb). us$26; cdn$34. There is a spectre haunting Katie Roiphe’s exploration of Edwardian/Georgian marriage in literary London circles: the spectre of Bertrand Russell, most especially the author of Marriage and Moralsz (1929), a work written in the middle of the period she examines. While Russell makes a few guest appearances in April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd 182 Reviews the text, and while he knew almost everyone in the book (sometimes biblically), it is surprising that Roiphe does not take the opportunity to connect the rather disparate couples she discusses with Russell’s contemporary exploration of the meaning of marriage in the post-Victorian era. She focuses on couples living together from directly before the First World War to directly before the Second World War, a period of tremendous change and radical social movements: Modernism, Socialism, Freudianism,and, perhaps most important to the overall structure of the book, SuTragism/Feminism. One of the most telling aspects of Uncommon Arrangements is the focus on somez—zfor the timesz—zuncommonly liberated women. Katie Roiphe is a journalist and an instructor at New York University who has written extensively about modern marriage. Her Uncommon Arrangements tells the story of seven married couples in early twentieth-century England, all of whom tried to live outside the framework of conventional society. They revolted against Victorian values and sought to establish relations between men and women on an equal basis. Most of these couples travelled in the same circles as Russell, and were subject to the same intellectual inXuences. In Marriage and Moralsz—zwritten, ironically, during the time of the slow and painful dissolution of his own second marriagez—zRussell attempted to advocate a rational code of sexual ethics. He believed in openness and honesty about sex and denied that marital Wdelity was the be-all and end-all of morality. The true basis of morality, he said, was respect for the rights and feelings of your partner. Marriage and Morals was far ahead of its time in arguing that so-called “open marriages” (as well as couples living together without going through a marriage ceremony)were perfectly moral, so longas both partners accepted the conditions and did not engage in any deceptive acts. The couples discussed in Uncommon Arrangementsz—zwhile all were involved in relationships that could charitably be called “open”z—zdid not necessarily adhere to Russell’s “no deception” rule. Still, they provide interesting test cases for the idea that you can create a lasting marriage based on your own feelings and ideas without regard for convention. Interestingly, Roiphe does not deal with some likely suspects from this time period: the Lawrences, Woolfs, Eliots, and Bertrand and Dora Russell. In the Wrst chapter, Roiphe deals with the “modus vivendiy” between Wells and his second wife, Jane. Wells rebelled against his convention by Wrst of all divorcing his Wrst wife, Isabel, in 1895, and marrying his cousin Mary Catherine shortly thereafter. As a sign of his domineering personality, he renamed her “Jane”. Wells refused to accept limits on his sexual ambitions. As he put it once, “Except insofar as aTection put barriers around me, I have done what I pleased so that every bit of sexual impulse in me has expressed itselfz” (p. 36). In 1901, Jane gave birth to their son George Philip Wells. It was a troubled birth, and H.yG. ran oT. Instead of becoming angry, Jane understood and promised not to make too many demands on him. Thus their modus vivendiy. H.yG. April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users... (shrink)